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BROADNAX V. GONZALEZ: QUESTIONING 
THE IMPACT OF EXPANDING FETAL 
RIGHTS ON LITIGATION AND 
HEALTHCARE IN NEW YORK 
Elizabeth Lemanowicz∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult to imagine the anguish Marta Tebbutt faced on 
September 6, 1980, as she gave birth to a child she knew had died 
inside her.1 Postmortem examination of the fetus revealed that a 
negligently-performed amniocentesis, a test in which Marta’s 
doctor inserted a syringe into her lower abdomen in order to draw 
fluid from the amniotic fluid around the fetus, had possibly caused 
the fetus’s subsequent death.2 Marta turned to the courts for justice, 
suing her doctor and seeking to recover for her “pain, severe 
disappointment, anxiety, despondency, bitterness, and suffering.”3 
However, for Marta Tebbutt, relief was never granted.4 The trial 
court granted a motion by the defendant doctor for summary 
judgment, dismissing the complaint as insufficient as a matter of 
                                                          
 ∗ Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2006; B.A. in Justice, American 
University, 2002. The author would like to thank her family and friends for their 
love and support, especially Damon Osborne, who was infinitely helpful and 
patient during the entire writing process. She would also like to thank the staff 
and editors of the Journal of Law and Policy for all their hard work and help. 
1 Tebbutt v. Virostek, 477 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
2 Id. See also Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (N.Y. 1985) 
(describing the amniocentesis that Dr. Virostek administered to Marta Tebbutt) 
(Jasen, J., dissenting). 
3 Tebbutt, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 777. 
4 Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1143 (affirming the trial court’s order granting 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint). 
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law.5 The appellate court affirmed the motion to dismiss,6 and 
finally, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the motion as 
well.7 The courts reasoned that Marta had not suffered any 
physical injury that would give rise to a claim for emotional 
distress as a result of the stillborn birth.8 Without an independent 
physical injury, Marta had no legal right to recovery for her 
emotional injuries, and this would be the case for similarly situated 
women for years to come. 
The legal impediments faced by women such as Marta Tebbutt 
were lifted in 2004 when the New York Court of Appeals decided 
the landmark case of Broadnax v. Gonzalez, holding that, “even in 
the absence of an independent injury, medical malpractice 
resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth should be construed as a 
violation of a duty of care to the expectant mother, entitling her to 
damages for emotional distress.”9 Broadnax marked the end of 
nearly twenty years of precedent that denied mothers damages for 
emotional distress suffered from negligently caused miscarriages 
or stillbirths unless they had experienced independent injuries.10 
                                                          
5 Tebbutt, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 777. 
6 Id. at 779. 
7 Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1143. 
8 Tebbutt, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 777-78; Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1143-44. The 
court noted that Marta Tebbutt alleged no physical injury distinct from that 
suffered by the fetus. Id. Having suffered no physical injury, the court held that 
Marta Tebbutt’s claim was governed by Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386 
(N.Y. 1980), in which the mother sought to recover for emotional injuries 
resulting from the harm done to her child in the womb. Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 
1143. Because the mother in Vaccaro did not learn of the harm done to the fetus 
until the birth, which occurred some time after the harm occurred, the court 
rejected the contention that the defendants owed a duty to the mother. Id. 
Similarly, in Tebbutt, the court rejected the mother’s claim for damages for 
emotional distress. Id. 
9 Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 649 (N.Y. 2004). 
10 Id. at 648. Accord Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985). In 
general, when there is a duty owed to a plaintiff by a defendant, a breach of that 
duty that results in emotional injury is compensable even though no physical 
injury occurred, but only if the breach “unreasonably endangered plaintiff’s 
physical safety.” 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d § 2:284, at 1476 (2005). However, in 
Broadnax, the Court of Appeals held that an expectant mother may recover 
damages for emotional distress resulting from a stillbirth or miscarriage that was 
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This comment analyzes the impact of Broadnax in New York. 
The focus of the analysis is two-pronged. The first prong focuses 
on the potential impact of the Broadnax decision on the future of 
wrongful death suits for fetuses in New York.11 The second prong 
focuses on the potential effect the decision will have on the 
availability and cost of gynecological services in New York and, 
consequently, on the rate of malpractice liability for obstetricians 
and gynecologists. This comment argues that Broadnax could open 
the door for a cause of action for wrongful fetal death, which is 
presently prohibited as a cause of action in New York courts. By 
reconsidering and expanding the rights of the mother and the fetus 
in cases of prenatal malpractice, it is conceivable that mothers and 
fetuses in the post-Broadnax era will be able to further push the 
boundaries of tort law and claim new causes of action grounded in 
wrongful death. This may be a substantial step in tort law, and 
perhaps it is theoretically just; however, it is yet unknown whether 
the liability that medical practitioners face will increase if a 
previously unrecognized class of plaintiffs—unborn fetuses and 
expectant mothers—are afforded significant legal rights.12 Indeed, 
the Broadnax decision may prove detrimental to society if, as a 
result of increasing liability for physicians, the provision of 
healthcare becomes sufficiently expensive to compel the exit of 
physicians from the fields of obstetrics and gynecology due to high 
                                                          
caused by medical malpractice, regardless of whether the mother suffered an 
independent physical injury or whether her physical safety was unreasonably 
endangered. Id. The Broadnax decision appears to have overruled decisions in 
which recovery was denied for emotional distress resulting from a stillbirth or 
miscarriage that was caused by medical malpractice in which the “independent 
physical injury” was limited to the physical pain and suffering that naturally 
accompanies the birthing process. 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d § 2:150, at 802 (2005). 
11 An action for “wrongful death” is a “lawsuit brought on behalf of a 
decedent’s survivors for their damages resulting from a tortious injury that 
caused the decedent’s death.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1607 (7th ed. 1999). 
New York’s wrongful death statute is set forth in N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 
5-4.1 (2000). New York does not have a wrongful life statute. 
12 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 650. “[T]here is no way for us to predict or 
assess the potential effect of this expansion of liability . . . on the cost and 
availability of gynecological and obstetrical services in New York State.” Id. 
(Read, J., dissenting). 
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insurance premiums and a fear of being sued.13 
Part I.A of this comment provides an overview of case law 
regarding tort-based causes of action for emotional or 
psychological injuries. Part I.B chronicles the history in New York 
of causes of action for emotional distress related to prenatal care, 
including a discussion of Tebbutt v. Virostek, the precursor to the 
Broadnax decision. Part I.C provides an analysis of the court’s 
holding and rationale in Broadnax. Part II.A focuses on the 
potential impact of Broadnax on wrongful death lawsuits in New 
York. Specifically, it contends that the reasons previously cited by 
the New York Court of Appeals for banning actions for the 
wrongful death of a fetus have been effectively undercut by the 
court’s decision in Broadnax. Part II.B briefly addresses the impact 
of Broadnax on the malpractice jurisprudence of the past year. Part 
III discusses the potential ramifications of Broadnax for the 
provision of obstetrical and gynecological care in New York. 
Finally, this comment concludes that the state legislature, not the 
judiciary, will need to take the lead if clarity and consistency is 
ever to come to the area of tort jurisprudence that encompasses 
fetal rights. 
I. BROADNAX V. GONZALEZ: PAST AND PRESENT 
In Broadnax v. Gonzalez,14 the New York Court of Appeals 
overruled Tebbutt v. Virostek,15 which held that unless an 
expectant mother suffered an independent physical injury, she had 
no right to recover damages for emotional distress resulting from a 
miscarriage or stillbirth.16 The Broadnax decision recognized that 
medical malpractice resulting in a miscarriage or stillbirth 
constituted a breach of duty to the expectant mother, and damages 
for emotional distress arising out of that breach should be 
                                                          
13 Medical Liability: Hearing on H.R.5 and H.R.4280 Before the House 
Committee on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearings] 
(statement of Dr. Donald J. Palmisano, M.D., J.D., Immediate Past-President of 
the American Medical Association) available at 2005 WL 408414 (F.D.C.H.). 
14 Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004). 
15 Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985). 
16 Id. See also 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d §2:280, at 1462-1463 (2005). 
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recoverable, even absent physical injury.17 In overruling Tebbutt, a 
case governed by the court’s earlier decision in Vaccaro v. 
Squibb,18 the majority in Broadnax relied heavily on the language 
and logic of the dissent in Tebbutt.19 
A. A Brief History of Case Law Regarding Causes of Action for 
Psychological Injuries 
 
The issue of whether to permit causes of action for emotional 
or psychic injuries absent independent physical injuries has been 
treated differently by New York courts throughout history. For a 
greater part of the twentieth century, New York courts insisted that 
a plaintiff could not recover for emotional injuries absent a 
physical injury.20 In 1961, the Court of Appeals fashioned a new 
rule that permitted recovery for emotional injuries absent 
immediate personal injury, but only if there was immediate fear or 
threat of bodily harm to the plaintiff directly.21 In Battalla v. State, 
an infant-plaintiff was placed in a chair lift at a state-run ski resort 
by an employee who failed to properly secure the infant and lock 
                                                          
17 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649; 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d § 2:280, at 1463 (2005). 
18 Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that a mother 
who was prescribed a toxic drug that rendered her child limbless at birth could 
not recover for emotional and psychic harm absent an independent injury). 
19 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648 (citing Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1144 (Jasen, 
J., dissenting)); Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1149 (Kaye, J., dissenting). “On its own 
terms, Tebbutt may make formal sense, but it created a logical gap in which the 
fetus is consigned to a state of ‘juridical limbo.’ It is time to fill the gap. If the 
fetus cannot bring suit, ‘it must follow in the eyes of the law that any injury here 
was done to the mother.’” Id. (quoting language from the dissenting opinions in 
Tebbutt). 
20 Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896) (holding 
that a woman who miscarried as a result of being frightened by a team of horses 
owned by railroad company did not have a cause of action, there being no 
recovery available for mere fright absent immediate personal injury). 
21 Battalla v. New York, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961) (holding that a cause 
of action exists when a claimant alleges that she was negligently caused to suffer 
emotional and psychological injuries with consequential physical injuries). 
BETH MACROED CORRECTED FINAL 060605.DOC 6/6/2005 1:37 PM 
812 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
the equipment.22 As a result, the infant became frightened and 
hysterical while riding on the chair lift and suffered “severe 
emotional and neurological disturbances with residual physical 
manifestations.”23 Under the principle that “a wrong-doer is 
responsible for the natural and proximate consequences of his 
misconduct,”24 the court held that the claimant should have the 
opportunity to prove that her emotional injuries, leading to her 
subsequent physical injuries, were the proximate result of the 
defendant’s negligence. Thus, after Battalla, contemporaneous or 
consequential physical harm, coupled with psychological injuries, 
was thought to provide an “index of reliability otherwise absent in 
a claim for psychological trauma with only psychological 
consequences.”25 
From the Battalla decision developed the rule that “one may 
have a cause of action for injuries sustained although precipitated 
by a negligently induced mental trauma without physical 
impact.”26 In 1969, the Court of Appeals refused to apply the 
Battalla rule to cases in which the tortfeasor’s duty not to cause 
physical injury did not apply to the claimant seeking damages for 
emotional and subsequent physical distress.27 In Tobin v. 
Grossman, a mother was in a neighbor’s home when she heard 
brakes screeching outside.28 She ran outside to find her injured 
child lying on the ground at the site of the accident.29 The court 
held that the plaintiff-mother was barred from bringing a cause of 
action for her mental and consequential physical injuries caused by 
                                                          
22 Id. at 729. 
23 Id. The “residual physical manifestations” were not explained or clarified 
in either the trial or appellate level decisions. See Battalla v. State, 184 N.Y.S.2d 
1016 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1959); Battalla v. State, 200 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1960). 
24 Battalla, 176 N.E.2d. at 730 (quoting Ehrgott v. Mayor of City of N.Y., 
96 N.Y. 264, 281 (1884)). 
25 Johnson v. New York, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592 (N.Y. 1975). 
26 Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 420-21 (N.Y. 1969) (addressing the 
issue of the possibility of recovery for physical injuries resulting from a purely 
mental or psychological impact). 
27 Id. at 419-20. 
28 Id. at 419. 
29 Id.  
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shock and fear for her child.30 The principles espoused in Battalla 
made clear that an individual could bring a cause of action for 
injuries that caused psychological trauma and consequential 
physical injuries, even absent contemporaneous physical impact.31 
Yet in Tobin, the court held that a cause of action did not exist for 
psychological harm sustained by a person as a result of someone 
else’s injuries, regardless of whether a special relationship existed 
between the two individuals or whether the emotionally injured 
person was an eyewitness to the incident that resulted in harm to 
the other.32 
However, in 1975, New York extended the rule in Battalla to a 
situation in which the defendant’s negligence caused neither 
contemporaneous nor consequential physical harm to the 
plaintiff.33 In Johnson v. State, the plaintiff suffered emotional 
harm as a direct result of the negligence of a state hospital, which 
falsely notified the plaintiff that her mother, a patient at the 
hospital, had died.34 The plaintiff’s emotional injuries were 
unaccompanied by any physical injury.35 The Court of Appeals 
held that it was the hospital’s duty to responsibly advise the proper 
next of kin of a patient’s death and that recovery for emotional 
harm would be permitted by an individual subjected directly to a 
tortious act, such as the negligent mishandling of a corpse or the 
negligent false notification of death.36 Johnson clarified that 
individuals may recover for emotional harm, even in the absence 
of fear of physical injury, when they are subjected directly to the 
negligence of a tortfeasor.37 For such recovery, however, 
individuals must prove that any suffered psychological injuries are 
genuine and substantial, and that these injuries were proximately 
caused by the defendant’s conduct.38 
                                                          
30 Id. at 420, 424. 
31 Id. at 420-21. 
32 Id. at 423-24. 
33 Johnson v. New York, 334 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1975). 
34 Id. at 591. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 593. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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B. Causes of Action for Psychological Injuries Caused by 
Negligent Prenatal Care 
The status of recovery for emotional suffering can be broken 
down into four main rules: (1) where a tortfeasor causes physical 
injury to another, the injured party can recover for the actual 
physical injury and concurrent mental and emotional suffering 
resulting from the wrongful act;39 (2) where a tortfeasor directly 
causes the injured party to experience fear of physical injury as a 
direct result of the tortious conduct, the party can recover for 
psychic injuries absent physical impact;40 (3) where a tortfeasor 
physically injures one party, recovery is denied for mental and 
emotional injuries experienced by a third party as a result of the 
physical injuries sustained by the first party; 41 but (4) where a 
tortfeasor genuinely, substantially, and proximately causes 
psychological injuries to the injured party, the injured party can 
recover for the emotional harm, even in the absence of fear of 
potential physical injury.42 These rules can be applied to cases of 
medical malpractice in which a doctor’s negligence causes 
physical injuries to a fetus, resulting in the miscarriage, stillbirth, 
or permanent impairment of the child. Courts previously have 
addressed such cases from the vantage point of the mother and 
have examined whether a mother’s right to collect damages for 
emotional distress resulting from the physical injuries sustained to 
the fetus inside her is a situation consistent with any of the four 
main rules. 
In 1977, the New York Court of Appeals decided the case of 
Howard v. Lecher, based on the third rule above, holding that a 
parent who suffers psychological injuries as a result of a doctor’s 
medical malpractice in treating a fetus cannot recover for such 
damages.43 In Howard, the plaintiffs were the parents of a child 
who died from Tay-Sachs disease, a progressive degenerative 
                                                          
39 Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896). 
40 Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961). 
41 Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969). 
42 Johnson v. New York, 334 NE.2d 590 (N.Y. 1975). 
43 Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977). 
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disease that affects the nervous system and tends to appear more 
often in children with parents of Eastern European Jewish 
descent.44 The parents alleged that the doctor-defendant was 
negligent in failing to properly perform or evaluate a genealogical 
history of the parents, given his knowledge that the Howards were 
both Eastern European Jews and that there was a high risk that the 
fetus would be born with Tay-Sachs.45 The Howards claimed that, 
had the doctor informed them of this risk, they would have chosen 
to abort the fetus.46 The parents brought a cause of action to 
recover from the defendant-doctor for the emotional and mental 
distress they experienced from witnessing their child suffer and die 
from such a devastating disease.47 In this case, the court held that 
the parents were not made to suffer any physical or mental injury, 
except for the pain in watching their child suffer from Tay-Sachs, 
and that the doctor’s negligence was not the direct cause of the 
child’s suffering from the disease.48 The court suggested that, even 
in a case in which the negligent conduct of a doctor directly injured 
a fetus but in no manner physically injured the parents, there could 
be no recovery for the mental and emotional pain and suffering of 
the parents.49 Thus, there could be no recovery for the mental and 
emotional injuries experienced by the parents in Howard.50 
In 1978, the court decided the case of Becker v. Schwartz based 
on the principles espoused in Howard.51 In Becker, two cases were 
combined in which the plaintiffs sought damages for emotional 
distress alleged to have occurred as a consequence of the birth of 
their infants in an impaired state, the birth of those infants having 
occurred through the negligence of the defendant-doctors.52 In 
Becker, the plaintiffs had received prenatal care from the 
                                                          
44 Howard, 366 N.E.2d at 64-65, 67. 
45 Id. at 65. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 64-65, 66. 
48 Id. at 66. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). 
52 Id. at 809. 
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defendant-doctors.53 Plaintiff-mother Delores Becker was thirty-
seven years old at the time of her pregnancy and at no point during 
the prenatal care provided by the defendant-doctors was Delores 
informed that, based on her age, she was at an increased risk of 
bearing a child with Down’s Syndrome.54 Becker subsequently 
gave birth to an infant with Down’s Syndrome.55 Becker and her 
husband claimed damages for the pecuniary expenses they bore 
and would continue to bear for the care and treatment of their 
infant, and for the emotional and physical injuries suffered by 
Delores as a result of her child’s having been born with Down’s 
Syndrome.56 
In a companion case, Park v. Chessin, Hetty Park and her 
husband consulted the defendant-doctors to determine the 
likelihood that they would bear a child afflicted with a genetic 
kidney disease.57 Having already experienced the birth of a child 
who had died from a genetic kidney disease five hours after being 
born, the plaintiffs were concerned with the possibility that they 
might bear another child so afflicted.58 In response to the plaintiffs’ 
inquiry, the defendant-doctors told the Parks that the chances of 
having another baby afflicted with the kidney disease were 
“practically nil.”59 As a result of this information, the Parks 
renewed their efforts to conceive a child and Hetty subsequently 
gave birth to a baby born with a genetic kidney disease.60 The 
infant survived for only two and a half years before dying from the 
disease.61 Plaintiffs brought a claim seeking damages for the 
pecuniary expenses they bore for the care and treatment of their 
                                                          
53 Id. at 808. 
54 Id. at 808-09. 
55 Id. at 808. 
56 Id. at 809. 
57 Id. Hetty Park had already given birth to a baby who died five hours after 
birth from a polycystic kidney disease. Id. Based on their history, Hetty Park and 
her husband were questioning whether the kidney disease was a genetically-
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infant prior to his death, and for the psychological and physical 
injuries suffered by Hetty Park as the result of her child’s having 
been born with a genetic kidney disease.62 
The Becker court held that, while the parents might have a 
valid claim for the pecuniary expenses they endured or would 
continue to endure in providing care and treatment for their infants, 
there could be no recovery by the plaintiff-mothers for the 
psychological injuries they endured from having given birth to 
impaired infants, based on the court’s decision in Howard.63 
Furthermore, the court held that permitting the plaintiffs to recover 
for pecuniary loss but precluding recovery for the emotional 
injuries was consistent with the court’s decision in Johnson v. 
State, in which the court sustained a cause of action for emotional 
harm based on the plaintiff’s having been falsely informed by a 
hospital that her mother had died.64 In Johnson, the court 
recognized the existence of a duty by the hospital not to issue death 
notices in a negligent manner; the breach of this duty entitled the 
plaintiff to recover for harmful consequences proximately caused 
by the breach, including pecuniary loss and emotional harm caused 
by the tortious act.65 In distinguishing Johnson from Becker, the 
court restated the Johnson rule, which limited the plaintiff’s 
recovery to damages for the “proven harmful consequences 
proximately caused by the breach.”66 The court explained that, in 
Johnson, the causal nexus between the daughter’s emotional 
injuries and the hospital’s breach was clear, but that the “same 
cannot be confidently said with respect to the birth of a child, the 
conception of which was planned and fully desired by the 
parents.”67 While parents may suffer from psychological injuries 
due to the birth of their child in an impaired state, the parents may 
also “experience a love that even an abnormality cannot fully 
dampen.”68 Thus, to assess an amount for emotional damages 
                                                          
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 813. 
64 Id. (citing Johnson v. New York, 334 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1975)). 
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would require consideration of the “love” factor in mitigation of 
the parents’ emotional injuries.69 The court noted that, unlike 
Johnson, Becker required consideration of mitigating factors that 
would complicate the calculation of damages for the plaintiffs’ 
emotional injuries—injuries that would ultimately prove too 
speculative and uncertain to be deemed a “proven harmful 
consequence proximately caused by the breach” of the defendant-
doctors’ duties to the plaintiffs.70 
Following Becker, in 1980, the Court of Appeals decided 
Vaccaro v. Squibb.71 In that case, the plaintiff-mother, Inez 
Vaccaro, was prescribed a hormone by her physician to prevent the 
miscarriage of her baby, given that she had previously suffered a 
stillbirth and a miscarriage.72 The drug caused Vaccaro’s infant to 
be born with neither arms nor legs and with other serious injuries.73 
Relevant to damages for emotional distress, the plaintiffs brought a 
cause of action against the defendants, the physician and drug 
manufacturer, for “damages for the injuries to their nervous 
systems and emotional damage, personality changes and extreme 
mental anguish occasioned by the birth of their daughter without 
limbs and with other serious and permanent injuries and congenital 
defects” due to the plaintiff-mother’s having ingested the 
dangerous hormone during pregnancy.74 The trial court held that 
the facts of Vaccaro were more like the facts in Johnson than 
Howard because the plaintiffs in Vaccaro alleged that the infant’s 
deformities were the direct result of exposure to a drug 
administered to the mother by the mother’s physician during 
pregnancy.75 The court noted that this was a direct harm to the 
                                                          
69 Id. 
70 Id. Interestingly, the court here said that the legislature would be a better 
body than the judiciary to determine whether emotional damages should be 
permitted in cases in which the plaintiffs’ emotional injuries stemming from the 
prenatal medical malpractice that led to the birth of their infants in an impaired 
state might be mitigated by their love for the child. Id. 
71 Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1980). 
72 Vaccaro v. Squibb, 412 N.Y.S.2d 722, 723 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 724. 
75 Id. at 730. 
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mother and father caused by the breach of a duty owed by the 
defendants to the parents.76 Furthermore, the plaintiff-mother 
actually ingested the hormone, and thus, there was a triable issue 
of fact as to whether the psychological damages were the natural 
consequences of the wrongful act.77 Thus, the trial court denied the 
defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims for emotional 
damages.78 
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s holding in 
Vaccaro,79 in part holding that Vaccaro was more like Johnson 
than Tobin or Howard.80 The court explained that, in Vaccaro, a 
duty of care was owed by the doctor-defendant to the mother who 
ingested the hormone, as it was owed to the daughter falsely 
informed of her mother’s death in Johnson.81 This duty derived 
from the fact that the defendant-doctor was the mother’s physician, 
knew of her prior stillbirth and miscarriage, and selected and 
administered the hormone said to be responsible for the infant’s 
deformities.82 Unlike Tobin, the plaintiff-mother in Vaccaro was 
not a bystander; rather, the mother herself ingested the drug.83 
Additionally, in contrast to Howard, in Vaccaro there was 
“something more” than the failure to discuss with the parents the 
risk of bearing a child with Tay-Sachs syndrome.84 While the 
doctor in Howard had committed no affirmative acts or errors, the 
doctor in Vaccaro had affirmatively administered to the plaintiff-
mother a drug that subsequently caused her infant to be born 
impaired.85 Thus, the appellate level court held that the mother 
could maintain a cause of action for emotional distress, premised 
on the theory that she suffered from emotional harm directly 




79 Vaccaro v. Squibb, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). 
80 Id. at 681. 
81 Id. at 681-82.  
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caused by the breach of defendant-doctor’s duty to her.86 The 
father’s cause of action for emotional distress was dismissed, as he 
was not a patient of the doctor, did not ingest the drug, and thus, 
was owed no duty, the breach of which would give rise to a 
recovery.87 
Despite the holdings of both the trial and appellate level courts, 
the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff-mother’s cause of 
action for emotional distress could not stand in Vaccaro.88 Citing 
Howard and Becker, the majority dismissed the cause of action for 
the plaintiff-mother’s emotional injuries because she did not set 
forth evidence of any independent injuries.89 This brief but 
steadfast application of Howard and Becker would set the stage for 
the court’s decision in Tebbutt v. Virostek, the precedent case that 
would not be overturned until Broadnax v. Gonzalez, almost 
twenty years later. 
In 1985, the Court of Appeals decided Tebbutt v. Virostek,90 in 
which the alleged negligence of medical care providers directly 
resulted in a fetus’s death in utero, although the mother suffered no 
physical injuries distinct from the injuries to the fetus.91 In Tebbutt, 
the plaintiff’s obstetrician attempted to perform an amniocentesis 
three times with no success.92 Prior to the first attempted 
amniocentesis, the fetal heart monitor showed the fetus to be viable 
                                                          
86 Id. at 683-84. The court held that “[t]here is a vital interest to be 
protected, there is proximate cause, there is demonstrable injury and there is 
foreseeability. ‘Thus, the rationale underlying the Tobin case, namely, the real 
dangers of extending recovery for harm to others than those directly involved, is 
inapplicable to the instant case.’” Id. (citing Johnson v. New York, 334 N.E.2d 
590, 593 (N.Y. 1975)).  
87 Id. at 684. 
88 Vaccaro, 418 N.E.2d at 386. 
89 Id. 
90 Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985). 
91 Id. at 1143. See also Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 647-48 
(N.Y. 2004). 
92 Tebbutt v. Virostek, 477 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); 
Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1144 (describing the amniocentesis that Dr. Virostek 
administered to Marta Tebbutt) (Jasen, J., dissenting). An amniocentesis is a 
procedure in which a syringe punctures the womb in order to draw fluid for 
testing. Id. 
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and of normal size for a sixteen-week gestation.93 More than a 
month later, despite reassurances that the fetus was normal, the 
plaintiff-mother delivered a stillborn baby, bearing three 
hemorrhagic blisters, whose size was consistent with sixteen-week 
gestation.94 Doctors concluded that it was possible that the failed 
amniocentesis attempts caused the fetal death.95 In her claim to 
recover for “pain, severe disappointment, anxiety, despondency, 
bitterness, and suffering,”96 the plaintiff alleged no physical 
injuries apart from those suffered by the fetus.97 
The majority in Tebbutt rejected the plaintiff’s claim for 
damages for emotional distress.98 The court succinctly explained 
that the plaintiff’s claims for emotional damages must be denied 
based on Vaccaro v. Squibb, which held that damages for 
emotional distress may not be recovered by the parents of children 
who are injured in utero but born alive.99 In Vaccaro, the court 
“rejected the contention that the defendants owed any duty to the 
mother” where the harm done to the child in utero was not 
discovered until the birth of the child, some time after the damage 
was done.100 Based on the logic of Vaccaro, the Tebbutt majority 
rejected the mother’s claim for emotional distress damages.101 
While the majority declared that the plaintiff-mother was not 
owed a duty by her doctors, the dissent in Tebbutt expressed 
considerable concern about the consequences of precluding 
emotional distress claims by mothers of fetuses negligently killed 
                                                          
93 Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1144. 
94 Id. at 1145. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1143, 1145. 
97 Id. at 1143, 1145. 
98 Id. at 1143. 
99 Id. at 1144 (citing Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1980)). 
100 Id. at 1143 (citing Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1980)). 
101 Id. at 1143-44. Interestingly, in Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386, 387 
n.* (N.Y. 1980), the dissenting judge reflected on the “stultifying effect of what 
may be too indiscriminating an application of stare decisis.” In his dissent, the 
judge stated that the defendants owed a duty directly to the mother as the patient 
of the doctor and the consumer of the implicated drug (the patient had ingested a 
prescription drug that caused deformities in her baby). Vaccaro, 418 N.E.2d at 
387. 
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in utero.102 The dissent explained that the majority had created a 
“juridical limbo,” in which a physician’s negligent acts resulting in 
the death of an unborn child would be “neither compensated nor 
deterred.”103 The dissent concluded that a child killed in utero has 
no rights under the law for two reasons: (1) for purposes of the 
wrongful death statute, the stillborn child is not considered a 
“person” who is owed a duty of care;104 and (2) under the Tebbutt 
majority’s rationale, for the purposes of a personal injury action, 
the stillborn child is not owed a duty of care.105 Under the 
majority’s analysis, if the child in the case were born alive, a 
remedy would exist;106 however, if the child were more seriously 
injured, resulting in the child’s death, the loss would go 
unredressed.107 The dissent thus concluded that “[w]here the law 
declares that the stillborn child is not a person who can bring suit, 
then it must follow in the eyes of the law that any injury here was 
done to the mother.”108 According to the dissent’s logic, the mother 
should have been able to bring a claim of emotional distress 
resulting from the stillbirth of her child. 
C. Broadnax v. Gonzalez 
Tebbutt provided the New York courts with a precedent that 
was strictly adhered to for nearly twenty years until two cases—
Broadnax v. Gonzalez109 and Fahey v. Canino110—percolated up 
through the courts. At the trial level, the plaintiff-mothers sought 
damages for emotional distress from their prenatal medical 
                                                          
102 Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1145 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 1144. 
104 Id. at 1148 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. 




109 Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 759 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), rev’d, 
809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004). 
110 Fahey v. Canino, 758 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) rev’d sub 
nom. Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004). 
BETH MACROED CORRECTED FINAL 060605.DOC 6/6/2005 1:37 PM 
 FETAL RIGHTS UNDER NEW YORK LAW 823 
caregivers based on malpractice that resulted in the deaths of the 
fetuses carried by the mothers.111 In both cases, the courts granted 
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, holding that the 
plaintiff-mothers could not recover for emotional or psychological 
injuries stemming from malpractice resulting in the death of an 
unborn child.112 Subsequently, the plaintiffs in both cases 
appealed; however, in both cases, the appellate court affirmed the 
judgments of the trial court.113 
In the early hours of September 24, 1994, Karen Broadnax, 
pregnant and almost due to give birth, called her midwife to say 
that her water had broken and that she was expelling blood.114 The 
midwife told Karen and her husband to come to the birthing center, 
but when Karen arrived just over an hour later, she was still 
experiencing vaginal bleeding.115 The midwife consulted Karen’s 
obstetrician, Dr. Gonzalez, who requested that Karen be 
transferred to a hospital.116 Approximately forty-five minutes later, 
Karen, her husband, and the midwife arrived at the hospital.117 
Although Karen’s obstetrician still had not arrived, the midwife 
failed to call or consult the on-call doctor at the hospital.118 When 
Dr. Gonzalez arrived two hours later, the fetal heart rate had 
already decelerated.119 However, instead of performing an 
emergency cesarean section, Dr. Gonzalez conducted a number of 
tests, including a vaginal and pelvic examination and a 
sonogram.120 Half an hour later, Karen delivered a full-term 
stillborn baby by cesarean section who, according to the autopsy, 
had died from a placental abruption.121 
                                                          
111 Broadnax, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 500; Fahey v. Canino, No. 40038(U), slip 
op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 5, 2002). 
112 Broadnax, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 500; Fahey, slip op. at 5. 
113 Broadnax, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 500; Fahey, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 710. 







121 Id. at 647. 
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Karen and her husband brought an action against Karen’s 
obstetrician, the midwife, and the hospital to recover damages for 
emotional distress resulting from the stillbirth of the baby.122 The 
appellate level court held that Tebbutt v. Virostek precluded 
mothers from “recovering damages for emotional or psychological 
harm stemming from the stillbirth . . . [unless they had] suffered a 
legally cognizable physical injury distinct from the fetus’s.”123 
Given that Karen Broadnax failed to produce evidence of an 
independent injury apart from those normally incident to 
childbirth, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.124 The appellate court affirmed the 
judgment.125 Applying Vaccaro and Tebbutt, the court rejected the 
possibility of recovering emotional damages for a negligently 
caused stillbirth, noting: 
There is an absence of evidence that the plaintiff mother 
suffered a physical injury distinct from the injury to her 
unborn child and separate and apart from that which occurs 
in any normal childbirth. Thus, she may not recover 
damages for the psychological and emotional harm she 
allegedly suffered as a result of the stillbirth of her child.126 
Debra Ann Fahey and her husband experienced a loss similar 
to that of the Broadnaxes. In August 1999, Debra Ann was told by 
her obstetrician, Dr. Canino, that she was carrying twins.127 Two 
months later at a regular checkup, Debra Ann informed Dr. 
Canino’s partner, Dr. Ruggiero, that she was experiencing lower 
back pain and cramping.128 Dr. Ruggiero performed an ultrasound 
and concluded that one of the twins was pressed against Debra 
Ann’s sciatic nerve, and that this was the source of her pain.129 
Two days later, Debra Ann experienced increasingly intense pain 
                                                          
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Broadnax, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 500. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 647. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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and nausea.130 She called Dr. Canino who, relying on Dr. 
Ruggiero’s examination, suggested to Debra Ann the pain was 
related to the sciatic nerve and that the nausea was probably related 
to something she ate for lunch.131 Dr. Canino simply told Debra 
Ann to lie down.132 While sitting on the toilet two hours later, 
Debra Ann tragically gave birth to one of the twins.133 With the 
umbilical cord from the first fetus still attached to her body, Debra 
Ann was transported by ambulance to the hospital, where she 
delivered the second twin.134 Neither twin lived.135 Debra Ann was 
later diagnosed with an “incompetent cervix,”136 a problem that is 
detectable by ultrasound and can be remedied with a surgical 
procedure.137 
The plaintiffs, Debra Ann and her husband, commenced a 
medical malpractice action against the defendant-doctors for the 
emotional distress caused by Debra Ann’s loss of the twins, 




133 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 647. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. An incompetent cervix is a weakened cervix that predisposes a 
woman to mid-term miscarriage or early (premature) delivery. Special Care 
Pregnancies: Incompetent Cervix, University of Pennsylvania Health System, at 
http://www.pennhealth.com/health_info/pregnancy/specialcare/articles/cervix/%
20html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Special Care Pregnancies]. 
137 If a doctor suspects that a woman might have an incompetent cervix, she 
can perform an ultrasound early in the pregnancy to examine the thickness of the 
cervical tissue. Special Care Pregnancies, supra note 136. A surgical procedure 
can successfully treat an incompetent cervix eighty-five percent to ninety 
percent of the time. Id. This procedure, called cerclage, is usually performed 
when the patient is under spinal or epidural anesthesia and involves closing the 
cervix with strong stitches for the full term of the pregnancy. Id. After having 
cerclage, a woman is usually prescribed medication to help prevent miscarriage. 
Id. The stitches are removed around the ninth month of pregnancy or sooner if 
labor commences, to prepare for delivery. Id. In a later pregnancy, Debra Ann 
Fahey was able to undergo a cerclage procedure to prevent her from delivering 
the fetus prematurely, and she was able to carry her pregnancy until the baby 
was healthy enough to survive (although the baby was born six weeks 
premature). Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 647. 
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arguing that the extra operations she had endured as a result of the 
negligently monitored labor and delivery constituted a “physical 
injury.”138 The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment,139 finding the plaintiff-mother’s “physical injury” 
argument without merit140 and her claim for emotional damages 
based on personal injury unsupported by her testimony.141 
Moreover, the trial court held that so long as Tebbutt provided the 
legal framework for prenatal cases, a mother could not recover for 
emotional damages resulting from a negligently caused stillbirth 
absent proof of her suffering an independent injury.142 Indeed, the 
court found “the more reasonable rule to be that which precludes 
recovery, not only for the emotional suffering resulting indirectly 
from the loss or impairment of the fetus or baby, but also for ‘the 
more immediate emotional harm attendant to the mother’s 
enduring a negligently caused stillbirth.’” The appellate court 
affirmed the trial court’s decision.143 
In April 2004, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the 
lower courts’ orders granting the defendants’ motions for summary 
                                                          
138 Fahey, slip op. at 2. Plaintiff’s arguments were in response to 
defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that a plaintiff may not recover for 
emotional distress resulting from a negligently caused stillbirth in the “absence 
of any independent, causative physical injury to her own person.” Id. 
139 Id. at 5. 
140 Id. at 2. 
141 Id. at 3. The court held:  
[P]laintiff’s testimony demonstrates that her primary concern was over 
the plight of the babies, [sic] and their condition . . . there is simply 
nothing in the record to support a finding that plaintiff suffered any . . . 
psychological trauma as a result of her own condition or experiences, 
separable from the distress she felt because of the condition or death of 
the fetuses.”  
Id. (citations omitted). 
142 Id. at 5.  
143 Fahey, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (holding that the plaintiffs failed to present 
evidence that the mother was independently injured beyond those injuries 
naturally caused during childbirth, and as such, the cause of action for emotional 
distress was properly dismissed because recovery for psychological damages 
resulting from the stillbirth was precluded “in view of the present status of the 
law”). 
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judgment in both Broadnax and Fahey.144 The court addressed the 
issue of when, if ever, a mother could recover damages for 
emotional distress resulting from a miscarriage or stillbirth caused 
by medical malpractice absent a showing of independent physical 
injury to the mother.145 The court recognized that precedent 
strongly disfavored claims for emotional distress in cases in which 
the plaintiffs had suffered no independent physical injuries.146 
However, the court noted that applying a strict interpretation of 
this rule in cases of negligently caused stillbirths creates a “logical 
gap in which the fetus is consigned to a state of ‘juridical 
limbo.’”147 Essentially, infants who were injured in utero but 
survived could maintain a cause of action for medical malpractice 
against tortfeasors after they were born.148 Furthermore, a pregnant 
mother could bring a cause of action for her independent 
injuries.149 However, neither party had a cause of action if medical 
malpractice had caused the pregnancy to terminate in miscarriage 
or stillbirth and the mother was not physically injured beyond the 
pain and suffering naturally attendant to childbirth.150 The gap 
created by precedent resulted in an uncomfortable dichotomy: 
medical caregivers faced liability for injuries to fetuses that 
survived, but faced no liability for injuries to fetuses that died in 
utero.151 
In Broadnax, the defendants argued against the permissibility 
of claims for emotional damages resulting from the wrongful death 
of a fetus, grounding their challenge in the fact that the defendants’ 
                                                          
144 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 647. 
145 Id. at 646. 
146 Id. at 648. 




150 Id. In both Appellate Division decisions, the courts held that the 
procedures incident to childbirth, miscarriage, or stillbirth are not considered 
independent physical injuries to the mother, and thus, do not allow for a cause of 
action for emotional distress. See Broadnax, N.Y.S.2d at 500; Fahey, 758 
N.Y.S.2d at 710. 
151 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648. 
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actions, negligent or otherwise, did not violate a duty to the 
expectant mothers; rather, the alleged conduct injured only the 
fetuses.152 The court dismissed this argument as “tortured” 
reasoning.153 The court explained that, given that prenatal medical 
providers owe a duty of care to the developing fetus, the providers 
would naturally owe a corresponding duty of care to the mother, 
who is the primary patient during the entire pregnancy.154 The 
court determined the health of the mother and the fetus to be linked 
in the unique situation of pregnancy, but in the same breath, 
clarified that the fetus and the mother are each owed a duty of 
care.155 Thus, in overturning nearly twenty years of precedent, the 
court held that, “even in the absence of an independent injury, 
medical malpractice resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth should be 
construed as a violation of a duty of care to the expectant mother, 
entitling her to damages for emotional distress.”156 
Broadnax was decided 6-1 in favor of the plaintiff-mothers.157 
In the only dissenting opinion, Judge Reed posed the possibility 
                                                          
152 Id. 
153 Id. The “[d]efendants [argue that] their alleged conduct injured only the 
fetuses, and, accordingly, they did not violate a duty to the expectant mothers. 
Defendants’ reasoning is tortured.” Id. 
154 Id. (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951)). In Woods v. 
Lancet, the plaintiff-infant sustained serious injuries through the negligent 
actions of his mother’s physician, such that he was born permanently impaired 
and disabled. Woods, 102 N.E.2d at 691-92. The court held that the infant, 
injured in utero and later born alive, had the right to maintain an action for the 
alleged negligence causing such injury. Woods, 102 N.E.2d at 695. 
155 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648-49. Cf. Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 
1142, 1146 (N.Y. 1985) (Jasen, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Jensen 
noted: 
The interests of the mother and the unborn child are intertwined by 
nature during the mother’s pregnancy. Due to these relationships, a 
tortious act, which results in the death of an unborn child, represents a 
breach of a direct duty to the mother. Defendant’s infringement upon 
the mother’s freedom from mental distress was occasioned by the 
breach of a distinct and independent duty flowing to the mother.  
Id.  
156 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649. 
157 Id. 
BETH MACROED CORRECTED FINAL 060605.DOC 6/6/2005 1:37 PM 
 FETAL RIGHTS UNDER NEW YORK LAW 829 
that the decision might expose medical caregivers to additional 
liability.158 Of great concern to her was that there was no way, at 
the time of the decision, to assess or predict the potential effect of 
increased liability on the availability and cost of gynecological and 
obstetrical care in New York.159 
II. BEYOND BROADNAX 
In its indication that a fetus enjoys a legal status independent of 
the mother, Broadnax v. Gonzalez stands in stark contrast to New 
York’s past jurisprudence regarding actions for the wrongful death 
of a fetus. In 1969, the New York Court of Appeals affirmatively 
stated in Endresz v. Friedberg that actions for the wrongful death 
of a fetus are barred in New York.160 In Endresz, the court 
discussed at length the reasons for denying the survivors to fetuses 
negligently killed by medical malpractice in utero the right to sue 
the physician tortfeasors.161 Broadnax, however—in holding that 
the fetus is a separate being, that the fetus need not be born to have 
rights, and that the difficulty of calculating damages is not a 
justification for barring wrongful death suits—may render the logic 
of Endresz invalid. In so doing, Broadnax possesses the potential 
to work a significant change in the law regarding fetal rights. The 
precise impact of Broadnax is as yet unclear; however, in testing 
the boundaries of this new precedent, plaintiffs and the lower 
courts may compel the reevaluation of the recovery bar for actions 
                                                          
158 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 650; See supra note 12. 
159 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 650. 
160 Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 902, 907 (N.Y. 1969). The 
Endresz court upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s wrongful 
death suits and claims for loss of services of the infants, holding that 
the fairest and most practical solution . . . the one most in accord with 
the dictates of justice, public policy and common sense . . . [is] to leave 
the parents of a stillborn fetus, whose death has been caused by a third 
party’s wrongful act, to the damages recoverable by them in their own 
right and to deny to the distributees any redress by way of a wrongful 
death action. 
 Id. at 907. 
161 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 903-05. 
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grounded in the wrongful death of a fetus. Indeed, only through 
clarification by the New York Court of Appeals or the New York 
State legislature will stability and predictability come to the law of 
torts related to fetal rights. 
A. The Unraveling of Endresz: Broadnax’s Implications for 
Wrongful Death Law 
An action for wrongful death is a lawsuit brought by the 
survivors of a decedent whose death resulted from a defendant’s 
negligent or wrongful act.162 A majority of jurisdictions today, 
with the exception of New York, recognize that a cause of action 
lies for the negligently caused death of an unborn child.163 The old 
rule,164 which barred actions for the wrongful death of an unborn 
child, held that the fetus was not a person for whom recovery could 
be made under wrongful death, as the fetus was part of the mother 
at the time of the injury.165 This rule was abandoned by most states 
                                                          
162 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. See also 12 AM. JUR. Trials § 
317 (2004). 
163 James M. Simpson, Growing Recognition of Wrongful Death for 
Unborn Children, ADVOCACY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES (Int’l Ass’n of Def. 
Counsel, Aug. 2001), reprinted in DEFENSE COUNSEL JOURNAL, Oct. 1, 2001, at 
487. The following U.S. jurisdictions either explicitly or implicitly recognize a 
wrongful death action for the death of an unborn child by statute, state case law, 
or federal case law: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
District of Columbia, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, 
and West Virginia. Id. 
164 Simpson, supra note 163 (citing Dietrich v. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 
242, 138 Mass. 14 (1884)). The rule barring actions for the wrongful death of an 
unborn child was promulgated by Oliver Wendell Holmes in Dietrich v. 
Inhabitants of Northampton in 1884. Id. 
165 Simpson, supra note 163 (citing Dietrich v. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 
242138 Mass. 14 (1884)). This rule is no longer applicable in jurisdictions that 
have concluded that unborn children are “persons” within the meaning of the 
wrongful death statutes. Simpson, supra note 163. For example, in 2001, the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas was asked to reconsider its position in Chatelain v. 
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in part because advances in medicine “fundamentally changed the 
way the modern mind conceptualizes ‘separateness’ between 
mother and child.”166 Nonetheless, New York courts maintain a bar 
against actions based on the wrongful death of a fetus dating from 
the New York Court of Appeals’s decision in Endresz, which 
foreclosed this avenue of relief.167 
In Endresz, a pregnant woman was injured in a car accident 
negligently caused by another driver.168 The injuries caused to her 
and her twin fetuses resulted in the stillbirth of both babies.169 The 
plaintiff-parents sued on behalf of the unborn twins for wrongful 
death.170 In dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful death, 
the court held that when an unborn child is injured through the 
wrongful act of a defendant, “liability attaches only upon 
fulfillment of the condition that the child be born alive.”171 The 
court thus concluded that there was no right of recovery under 
New York law by the personal representative of a stillborn fetus 
that had died as a result of injuries received while in utero.172 
Importantly, although Broadnax expressly declared that there 
was no right of recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus,173 the 
                                                          
Kelley, 910 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Ark. 1995), that a viable fetus was not a “person” 
within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. Id. In Arkansas v. Jefferson 
Hospital Ass’n, 42 S.W.3d 508, 518 (Ark. 2001), the Court noted that their 
holding that a fetus was not a person was based on the Arkansas legislature’s 
former characterization of the word “person,” which had changed in the context 
of criminal law since Chatelain to include unborn children. Simpson, supra note 
163. The court noted that the holding in Chatelain that a fetus was not a person 
was seriously undermined by legislative change. Id. After Jefferson Hospital, 
the Arkansas legislature amended its wrongful death statute to include unborn 
children. Id. 
166 Simpson, supra note 163. 
167 Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969). 
168 Id. at 902. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 905. 
172 Id. at 907 (denying the distributees of the fetus a cause of action for the 
fetus’s wrongful death). 
173 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649 n.4. In footnote 4 of the majority opinion, 
the court noted that in rejecting Tebbutt, it also recognized that a majority of 
jurisdictions permit some form of recovery for negligently caused stillbirths or 
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case nonetheless challenges the logic of the arguments asserted in 
Endresz in support of a prohibition on such actions. 
The first reason advanced in Endresz for barring a cause of 
action for the wrongful death of a fetus is that an unborn child is 
not a decedent under the wrongful death statute.174 The majority 
opinion observed that the law in New York has declined to 
attribute the unborn fetus a “legal personality or identity ‘until it 
sees the light of day,’”175 and thus, a fetus killed as a result of 
medical malpractice could not be legally termed “deceased.”176 
However, the Court of Appeals acknowledged in Broadnax that a 
mother has a right to sue for emotional damages caused when 
medical malpractice results in a miscarriage or stillbirth precisely 
because the infant has no such right.177 Additionally, the court 
deemed the fetus to be owed a duty of care independent of the 
mother.178 By acknowledging that a fetus is owed an independent 
duty of care, the Broadnax decision suggests that an unborn fetus 
has a legal personality or identity.179 If this is true, then an unborn 
                                                          
miscarriages. The court then proceeded to specifically limit a mother’s recovery 
to damages for the emotional distress attending the stillbirth or miscarriage 
caused by medical malpractice, and affirmed the holding in Endresz v. 
Friedberg barring wrongful death actions under the circumstances of medical 
malpractice resulting in stillbirth or miscarriage. Id. The court gives no 
reasoning for this statement, other than the implied reasoning of stare decisis in 
saying, “[w]e do not depart from our holding in Endresz.” Id. 
174 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 903. However, the majority does admit that the 
statute is silent on this matter. Id. The majority interpreted the legislative intent 
to not have included unborn children within the meaning of the wrongful death 
statute based on the case law at the time the Decedent Estate law was written in 
1847. Id. The Decedent Estate Law became, without major changes, Section 5-
4.1 of the EPTL. Id.; see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (2004). 
175 Endresz, 485 N.E.2d at 904. 
176 Endresz, 485 N.E.2d at 905 (holding that a “conditional prospective 
liability” is created when a fetus is injured through the wrongful acts of the 
defendant, and as such, liability for those wrongful acts attaches only if the child 
is later born alive). 
177 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648. 
178 Id. 
179 In Endresz, the court noted that the law had never considered an unborn 
fetus as having a separate “juridical existence” or a legal personality or identity 
unless it was later born, as part of its reasoning that a fetus did not fall within the 
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child would fall within New York’s statutory definition of 
“deceased.”180 Thus, in light of the court’s holding in Broadnax, 
the first reason advanced in Endresz for denying a cause of action 
in wrongful death for an unborn fetus is no longer viable. 
The second reason articulated for barring causes of action in 
wrongful death for infants killed in utero is that a deprivation of 
life should not be actionable unless there has first been a birth.181 
Yet, the wrongful death statute is designed to compensate the 
decedent’s estate for the loss caused by the decedent’s death.182 
Given that the Broadnax court found it illogical to permit doctors 
to evade liability when their negligence results in the stillbirth or 
miscarriage of a fetus,183 it makes little sense to preclude recovery 
for wrongful death when a fetus dies in utero. In both cases, the 
fetus dies as a result of the negligence of a third party before it is 
born, and in both cases, a loss is occasioned by the death of the 
decedent.184 If the logic flowing from Broadnax is extended,185 the 
parents, as representatives of the decedent (the unborn fetus), must 
be permitted a cause of action for wrongful death simply because 
the fetus was deprived of life in the first place. 
                                                          
meaning of “person” for the purposes of the wrongful death statute. Endresz, 
248 N.E.2d at 904 (citations omitted). However, now the court in Broadnax has 
acknowledged that the fetus is owed a duty of care separate from the expectant 
mother, in addition to the duty of care owed to the mother. Broadnax, 809 
N.E.2d at 648. Thus, through the decision in Broadnax, the law may now 
consider an unborn fetus as having a separate “juridical existence” even when 
the fetus does not survive through birth. 
180 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (2004). 
181 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 903. 
182 Weisberg v. Layne-New York Co., 517 N.Y.S.2d 304 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1987) “The policy underlying [New York’s wrongful death statute] is . . . to 
compensate the decedent’s estate for loss suffered by his death.” Id. at 306. 
183 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648. 
184 The commentary to New York’s Pattern Jury Instructions for wrongful 
death actions states that “[i]n order to establish a right to a wrongful death 
recovery, the plaintiff need only show that he has a reasonable expectation of 
support from the decedent and therefore a pecuniary loss.” 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d § 
2:320, at 1565 (2005). 
185 The logic flowing from Broadnax is that the mother must be permitted 
to bring a cause of action for injury because the fetus itself cannot bring suit. 
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648. 
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The Broadnax court noted that had the fetus been born, as an 
infant it could have sued for its injuries.186 The court also held that 
since the fetus was not born, it must be the mother who was 
injured; thus, the court conferred upon the mother the right to bring 
suit simply because the fetus could not.187 The court’s argument 
essentially eliminates the birth requirement for the wrongful death 
statute. The wrongful death statute states as a condition of suit that 
the cause of action must be one that could have been sued upon 
had death not ensued.188 Had the fetus been born but injured in the 
womb and survived until at least birth, it could have sued for the 
negligent injuries it sustained in the womb.189 However, as the 
second prong of Broadnax explains, since those injuries killed the 
fetus, the survivors of the fetus must have the right to bring suit 
simply because the fetus was could not.190 The very fact that the 
fetus was not born, but could have been born, mandates the 
existence of a cause of action for wrongful death on behalf of the 
fetus’s survivors. Thus, to fulfill the policy reasons behind the 
wrongful death statute, the representatives of the unborn fetus must 
have a cause of action for wrongful death. 
The Endresz court supported its second reason for precluding a 
cause of action in wrongful death by stating that “considerations of 
justice which mandate the recovery of damages by an infant, 
injured in his mother’s womb and born deformed through the 
wrong of the third party, are absent where the foetus, deprived of 
life while yet unborn, is never faced with the prospect of impaired 
mental or physical health.”191 However, as noted, Broadnax 
expressly acknowledged that the child in utero is owed a duty of 
care by the medical professional treating the expectant mother’s 
pregnancy.192 The Broadnax court impliedly held that consigning 
the unborn fetus to a state in which it has no rights is an injustice in 
                                                          
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 908 (Burke, J., dissenting). 
189 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648. 
190 Id. 
191 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 903. 
192 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648. 
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itself193 that should be resolved by allowing the mother a cause of 
action for injuries if the fetus cannot bring suit.194 Thus, 
considerations of justice necessitate the recovery of damages by 
representatives of the fetus injured and killed in utero simply 
because that fetus never had the chance to bring suit in the first 
place. 
In his dissenting opinion in Endresz, Judge Burke dismissed 
the majority’s reliance on birth as a prerequisite for an action in 
wrongful death as illogical.195 First, citing language from Woods v. 
Lancet, Judge Burke declared that the majority’s reasoning was an 
“outmoded, timeworn fiction.”196 He proposed that life, not birth, 
should be the criteria by which the court reviews causes of action 
in wrongful death.197 Second, Judge Burke relied on an analogous 
Wisconsin case, from which he quoted: 
If no right of action is allowed, there is a wrong inflicted 
for which there is no remedy. Denying a right of action for 
negligent acts which produce a stillbirth leads to very 
incongruous results. For example, a doctor or midwife 
whose negligent acts in delivering a baby produced the 
baby’s death would be legally immune from a lawsuit. 
However, if they badly injured the child they would be 
exposed to liability. Such a rule would produce the absurd 
result that an unborn child who was badly injured by the 
tortious acts of another, but who was born alive, could 
recover while an unborn child, who was more severely 
injured and died as the result of the tortious act of another, 
could recover nothing.198 
Judge Burke’s criticism of this inconsistency is similar to that 
raised by the dissent in Tebbutt—that the practitioner who caused a 
more serious injury resulting in death would face less liability than 
                                                          
193 Akin to the aforementioned “juridical limbo,” mentioned supra note 19 
and accompanying text. 
194 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648. 
195 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 908 (Burke, J., dissenting). 
196 Id. (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951)). 
197 Id. at 908. 
198 Id. (citing Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 
20). 
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the practitioner who caused a more minor injury that the infant 
survived.199 The persuasiveness of Judge Burke’s dissent is given 
even more support by the Broadnax court’s express approval of the 
judge’s reasoning in its discussion of the rationale for permitting a 
cause of action by the mother for emotional damages on behalf of 
the fetus.200 Given this logic, it is likely that the second reason 
cited in Endresz against permitting a cause of action for wrongful 
death, specifically that there has been no birth, also has been 
impliedly overruled by Broadnax. 
The third reason advanced for prohibiting recovery for the 
wrongful death of fetuses negligently killed in utero is that 
damages for such injuries are difficult to calculate.201 In addressing 
this concern, Judge Burke, in his dissent in Endresz, argued that 
the difficulty of calculating damages should not preclude 
substantive recovery.202 Specifically, Judge Burke noted that the 
majority’s reliance on the argument that causation and damages are 
too difficult to calculate had been effectively dismissed by the 
court in Woods v. Lancet.203 Indeed, the majority in Woods 
asserted that “it is an inadmissible concept that uncertainty of proof 
can ever destroy a legal right.”204 Judge Burke noted that this 
portion of the Woods holding was cited approvingly by a Kentucky 
state court in its refusal to dismiss a cause of action for the 
wrongful death of a stillborn fetus based solely on the difficulty of 
estimating damages.205 Judge Burke thus concluded that the 
                                                          
199 Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1147-49. 
200 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648 (holding that Tebbutt wrongly “exposed 
medical caregivers to malpractice liability for in utero injuries when the fetus 
survived, but immunized them against any liability when their malpractice 
caused a miscarriage or stillbirth”). 
201 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 904 (holding that there are “no elements 
whatever upon which a jury could base any conclusion that a pecuniary injury 
has been suffered by the plaintiff from the loss of the unborn child”). 
202 Id. at 909. Compare Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649, in which the court 
dismisses the dissenting judge’s concerns about juries being asked to quantify 
the emotional distress that a woman feels upon suffering a miscarriage or 
stillbirth. 
203 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 909 (citing Woods, 303 N.Y. at 356). 
204 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 909. 
205 Id. at 909 (citing Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Ky. 1955)). 
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supposed difficulty of calculating damages should not be used to 
justify the denial of causes of action for the wrongful death of a 
fetus.206 Furthermore, the Broadnax majority was unconcerned that 
damages might be difficult to quantify.207 In addressing the 
dissent’s concern that juries would be asked to quantify the 
emotional distress experienced by a woman who has suffered a 
miscarriage or stillbirth, the majority responded that “no one from 
any quarter [had come] forward [during the appellate process] to 
support any such concerns.”208 It can be inferred from this 
statement that unless interested parties voiced concerns regarding 
any difficulties in affixing damages, the Broadnax majority would 
not consider such concerns sua sponte. Given the court’s sentiment 
that the difficulty of affixing damages does not justify adherence to 
Tebbutt, it is possible that the court may also find that the difficulty 
of affixing damages does not justify adherence to the principle in 
Endresz that wrongful death damages are barred in part because it 
would be difficult to calculate damages and causation in a claim 
for the wrongful death of a fetus. 
The fourth reason cited to preclude recovery for wrongful 
death by the personal representative of a stillborn fetus is that the 
parents would receive an undeserved windfall.209 The Endresz 
court noted that, in a given case, a mother could sue for any 
independent physical injuries she suffered and the father could sue 
for the loss of services, making any award for wrongful death an 
“unmerited bounty . . . [as the award] would constitute not 
compensation to the injured but punishment to the wrongdoer.”210 
However, this argument is undercut by the existence of cases in 
which a mother does not suffer any physical injuries from the 
                                                          
The Mitchell court, citing to Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951), held that 
uncertainty of proof, by itself, can never destroy a legal right. Mitchell, 285 
S.W.2d at 906. “The questions of causation and reasonable certainty which arise 
in these cases are no different in kind from the ones which have arisen in 
thousands of other negligence cases decided in this state in the past.” Id. 
206 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 909. 
207 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649. 
208 Id. 
209 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 904. 
210 Id. 
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stillbirth apart from those normally incident to childbirth.211 In 
such cases, prior to the Broadnax decision, if the plaintiff-mothers 
did not allege any independent physical injuries, they were barred 
from asserting causes of action for emotional damages.212 Notably, 
Broadnax has removed this bar to recovery.213 Thus, the Broadnax 
decision could influence the fourth Endresz factor in one of two 
ways: (1) either the court may look to Broadnax as representative 
of a current trend to permit greater recovery on behalf of plaintiff-
parents, thereby rendering the “unmerited bounty” argument 
outdated, or (2) the court could decide that because a mother can 
now recover for emotional distress, she should not be permitted to 
also recover as the representative of the fetus in a cause of action 
for wrongful death, given that the combination of the two damage 
awards would constitute an “unmerited bounty.”214 
If the reasoning in Endresz is outdated and a majority of other 
states recognize a cause of action for wrongful death of a fetus, 
why then do the New York courts consistently bar wrongful death 
actions on behalf of survivors of fetuses negligently killed in 
utero? The fundamental reasoning for barring wrongful death 
actions may parallel the reasoning cited by the New York state 
courts in barring actions for wrongful life—that the issue is one 
best addressed by the legislature, not the court.215 
An action for wrongful life is “[a] lawsuit brought by or on 
behalf of a child with birth defects, alleging that but for the 
defendant doctor’s negligent advice, the parents would have not 
conceived the child, or if they had, they would have aborted the 
fetus to avoid the pain and suffering resulting from the child’s 
congenital defects.”216 New York currently does not permit causes 
of action for wrongful life.217 While a parent may recover damages 
                                                          
211 See Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1143; see also Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 646. 
212 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648. 
213 Id. 
214 Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 904. 
215 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
216 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1607 (7th ed. 1999). 
217 Sheppard-Mobley v. King, 778 N.Y.S.2d 98, 101 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) 
(holding that “[n]o cause of action may be maintained on behalf of an infant 
plaintiff for ‘wrongful life,’ i.e., that he or she would never have been born but 
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for the increased cost of caring for the child until the age of 
majority,218 a child is barred from recovering damages for the 
extraordinary expenses that the child will incur upon reaching 
majority.219 In the landmark case Becker v. Schwartz, the court 
cited two reasons for barring claims for wrongful life.220 First, the 
court noted that children who bring wrongful life actions have not 
suffered any legally cognizable injuries, there being no 
“fundamental right . . . to be born as a whole, functional human 
being.”221 Second, the court found that damages would be 
impossible to compute, there being no way to provide a remedy 
that would place the infants in the place they would have occupied 
but for the negligence of the defendants because that place would 
have been nonexistence.222 These concerns echo those of the 
Endresz court regarding claims for wrongful death, specifically 
that an unborn child is not a legally cognizable person in the eyes 
of the wrongful death statute and that damages for the wrongful 
death of a fetus would be too difficult for a jury to calculate. 
In Becker, the majority voiced its discomfort with having to 
recognize claims for wrongful life, holding that the court was ill-
equipped to calculate damages based on a comparison between life 
in an impaired state and non-existence.223 Indeed, the court noted 
that “[r]ecognition of so novel a cause of action . . . is best reserved 
                                                          
for the negligence of the defendants”); see also Sample v. Levada, 779 N.Y.S.2d 
96, 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813 (N.Y. 
1978). 
218 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d 2:280, at 1464. “[P]arents may recover the cost of care 
and treatment of a disabled child born because of a negligent failure to test for or 
advise the parents of the potential for the birth of such a child . . . [t]his recovery 
is limited to the extraordinary expenses incurred . . . prior to the child’s 21st 
birthday.” Id. (citations omitted). 
219 Alquijay by Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Center, 473 N.E.2d 
244, 245 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that an infant does not have a cause of action in 
wrongful life because he cannot allege any cognizable injury, there being no 
right not to be born over being born impaired). 
220 Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 412. 
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for legislative, rather than judicial, attention.”224 Although 
wrongful death is not a novel cause of action and is recognized in a 
majority of states,225 New York continues to reject causes of action 
for wrongful death-of-fetus, primarily for reasons that echo its 
reasons for rejecting causes of action for wrongful life. Thus, 
perhaps as in the case of wrongful life, the cause of action for 
wrongful death is also best left to the legislature for a formal 
decision. If there is confusion regarding Broadnax’s implications 
for wrongful life actions, the legislature could affirmatively 
address this issue through an amendment to the wrongful death 
statute. State legislatures in South Dakota and Arkansas have 
drafted their wrongful death statutes to expressly permit actions on 
behalf of survivors of unborn children.226 These codes of these 
states could serve as a helpful model if the legislature decides to 
properly address the issue of wrongful death actions in New York. 
However, just as it has not yet addressed the issue of whether a 
cause of action lies for wrongful life, the New York legislature has 
stalled in enacting a statute providing that fetuses are persons for 
the purpose of the wrongful death statute. In 2003, the New York 
State legislature put forward bills in both the State Assembly and 
the Senate that, if enacted, would amend the Estates, Powers and 
Trusts Law to allow recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus 
which dies in the womb through a wrongful act or negligence by a 
third party.227 However, these bills have not yet been passed and 
remain in the committee stage.228 
B. The Application of Broadnax by New York Courts 
Broadnax is a fairly recent decision, and thus, New York courts 
have not been presented with many occasions in which to apply the 
principles articulated in the case. However, three significant lower 
                                                          
224 Id. 
225 Simpson, supra note 163. 
226 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-
102 (2004). 
227 S.B. 135, 226th Ann. Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003); S.A. 5753, 
226th Ann. Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). 
228 Id. 
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court decisions, Sheppard-Mobley v. King, Shaw v. QC-Medi New 
York, Inc., and Stuart v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 
and the very recent Court of Appeals decision to overturn 
Sheppard-Mobley v. King, address the Broadnax ruling directly.229 
The outcomes of these cases suggest that the courts are struggling 
to deal with the expansion of fetal and maternal rights that resulted 
from Broadnax. If nothing else, the four decisions indicate some 
disagreement among the courts with regard to how best to apply 
Broadnax. 
In June 2004, in Sheppard-Mobley, the Appellate Division, 
Second Department, extended the principles of Broadnax to the 
plaintiff-mother’s claim of emotional distress resulting from the 
successful birth of a child negligently injured in utero.230 Finding 
no reason to limit the Broadnax holding to cases of stillbirth and 
miscarriage, the Appellate Division relied on an analysis of 
previous Court of Appeals decisions, including Broadnax, Tebbutt, 
and Vaccaro, to demonstrate that the court had “repealed the 
independent physical injury requirement for all three categories of 
birth trauma.”231 First, the court in Sheppard-Mobley noted the 
holding in Broadnax that if there is a duty of care owed to the 
infant in utero, then surely there is a duty of care owed to the 
expectant mother.232 Second, the court held that, in prohibiting a 
mother’s recovery for emotional distress damages in the absence of 
an independent injury, it had consistently treated the miscarriage, 
stillbirth, or live birth of a fetus in an impaired state alike.233 Thus, 
miscarriage, stillbirth, and live birth of a fetus in an impaired state 
should be treated alike in allowing a mother’s recovery for 
emotional distress damages in the absence of an independent 
                                                          
229 Sheppard-Mobley v. King, 778 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); 
Shaw v. QC-Medi New York, 778 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Stuart 
v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., No. 9767/03, slip. op. at 1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 2005); Sheppard-Mobley v. King, No. 49, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 
1135, (N.Y. App. Div. May 10, 2005). 
230 Sheppard-Mobley, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 103-04. 
231 Id. at 103. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
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injury.234 Finally, the court noted that if Broadnax overruled 
Tebbutt, it should also overrule Vaccaro, which denied damages 
for emotional distress to the parents of children injured in utero but 
born alive.235 Consequently, the court held that recovery for 
emotional damages should be permitted when the defendant-
doctor’s negligence results in the live birth of a severely impaired 
child.236 
In addition to the Second Department’s holding that a mother’s 
right to recover for emotional distress under Broadnax extends to 
cases involving the live birth of a child in an impaired state,237 in 
early 2005, the Queens County Supreme Court held that the 
retroactive application of both Broadnax and Sheppard-Mobley 
was appropriate.238 The decision in Stuart v. New York City Health 
and Hospitals Corp. reflected a turning point in New York 
jurisprudence marked by Broadnax and Sheppard-Mobley. The 
judge noted that Broadnax and Sheppard-Mobley created a “new 
rule” that recognized actions for emotional distress absent physical 
injury.239 This rule fulfilled the “commendable purpose” of 
expanding the duty of care owed to expectant mothers.240 The 
court held that this “commendable purpose” was achieved by 
retroactive application, since there was no lawful justification for 
the old policy, which did not address a mother’s emotional 
wellbeing as dependent on the health of her child.241 Thus, the 
Stuart decision reinforced Broadnax and Sheppard-Mobley, 
comporting with the “spirit and direction” of the Court of 
                                                          
234 Id. 
235 Id.; see also supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text for a summary of 
Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1980)). 
236 Sheppard-Mobley, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 103. 
237 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d 2:280, at 1463 (2005); Sheppard-Mobley, 778 N.Y.S.2d 
at 103. 
238 Stuart, No. 9767/03, slip op. at 3. Retroactive application means that a 
change in law will be applied to injured parties that filed lawsuits prior to the 
change in law, in that they will be allowed to amend their complaint to include a 
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Appeals’s decisional law in this area.242  
From holdings such as the Second Department’s in Sheppard-
Mobley and the Queens County Supreme Court’s in Stuart, it 
appeared that the New York courts would progressively expand 
upon the holding in Broadnax and go to great lengths to permit 
recovery for emotional damages when a defendant-doctor’s 
negligence resulted in the live birth of a severely impaired child. 
However, in May 2005, the Court of Appeals reexamined 
Sheppard-Mobley and overturned the Second Department’s 
decision, holding that an expectant mother may not recover 
damages for emotional injuries when a defendant-doctor’s 
negligence causes injury to a fetus that later survives.243 The court 
explained that the holding in Broadnax was intended to “fill a gap” 
in tort jurisprudence that had exposed doctors to liability for their 
negligence when a fetus was born alive, but immunized them when 
the fetus died in the womb.244 Further, the court held that the 
Broadnax holding had been crafted to eliminate the injustice 
created by ignoring a small, but undoubtedly aggrieved, class of 
plaintiffs, and that it was this unique injustice that the court sought 
to rectify by permitting mothers, even absent an independent 
injury, to recover for emotional distress when medical malpractice 
resulted in the stillbirth or miscarriage of the fetuses they were 
carrying.245 Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the Second 
Department had wrongly applied the principles of Broadnax to the 
facts in Sheppard-Mobley because, as the court had held many 
years earlier in Woods v. Lancet, a child born alive has a cause of 
action for the physical injuries it sustained as a fetus through 
medical malpractice.246  
                                                          
242 Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 648 (N.Y. 2004). “In 
categorically denying recovery to a narrow, but indisputably aggrieved, class of 
plaintiffs, Tebbutt is at odds with the spirit and direction of our decisional law in 
this area.” Id. 
 243  Sheppard-Mobley v. King, No. 49, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 1135, at *1-2 (N.Y. 
App. Div. May 10, 2005). 
 244  Id. at *7.  
 245  Id. at *7. 
 246  Id. at *7-8 (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691). It is unclear 
whether the recent Court of Appeals’ decision in Sheppard-Mobley will impact 
the Queens County Supreme Court’s decision in Stuart. Andrew Harris, 
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The decision by the Court of Appeals to narrow the scope of 
Broadnax provides support for an earlier decision by the Appellate 
Division, Fourth Department, to narrowly interpret the Broadnax 
precedent. Only ten days after Sheppard-Mobley was decided by 
the Second Department in June 2004, the Appellate Division, 
Fourth Department, in Shaw v. QC-Medi New York, refused to 
extend Broadnax to the parents’ claims of emotional distress 
absent physical injury to the nonpatient plaintiff mother.247 In that 
case, the plaintiffs’ baby was born with severe defects requiring 
her to be on a ventilator and to receive twenty-four-hour nursing 
care.248 The infant’s mother was diabetic and her condition was 
aggravated by stress.249 The nursing staff hired by the plaintiffs 
was apprised of the mother’s poor health.250 When one of the 
nurses failed to adequately respond to an alarm on the infant’s 
ventilator, the plaintiff returned home to find her two-year-old 
daughter “sweating profusely, very blue, and barely conscious.”251 
The child later recovered, but the mother sued for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, arguing that an independent duty 
was owed to her by the defendant nurses because they were “on 
notice of her condition and the effect that stress had upon it.”252 
The court held that, despite the decision in Broadnax to permit 
                                                          
Expanding ‘Broadnax’; Court of Appeals Soon to Rule On Case Used By Suffolk 
Judge to Add Emotional Distress Claim to Neo-Natal Malpractice Suit, N.Y. 
L.J., May 10, 2005, at 16 (noting, prior to the publication of the Court of 
Appeals decision on Sheppard-Mobley, that if the Court of Appeals overturned 
the Second Department’s decision in Sheppard-Mobley, the new holding could 
“sweep away” the decision in Stuart as well). 
247 Shaw v. QC-Medi New York, 778 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
248 Id. The child’s severe defects were not caused by medical malpractice 
and are important to the case only in that the defects caused the child to need 
twenty-four-hour nursing care and attention. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. Before the incident in question, the parents in Shaw were frustrated 
when their nurses sometimes failed to show up for work. The father wrote a 
letter informing the nursing service that his wife’s severe diabetes was being 
exacerbated by the stress of the nursing staff’s “lack of professional 
commitment,” and that the stress his wife was under was “literally killing her.” 
Id. 
251 Id. at 792-93. 
252 Id. at 793. 
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recovery for a mother’s emotional distress resulting from 
negligence to her fetus, the duty of care owed to a patient-mother 
in pregnancy was unique, and thus, the principles of Broadnax 
were not applicable to cases in which the mother was a 
nonpatient.253 Thus, it appears for now that the principles of 
Broadnax may not extend to instances involving a nonpatient 
parent.254 
It is clear that the New York courts are in a state of transition 
regarding their willingness, or unwillingness, to extend the 
principles announced in Broadnax to other situations. The Court of 
Appeals’s decision in Sheppard-Mobley strongly suggests that the 
holding of Broadnax will be applied very narrowly in the future. 
However, Sheppard-Mobley only addresses the potential for a 
mother to recover emotional damages for prenatal negligence that 
resulted in the birth of an impaired baby. Importantly, the holding 
of Broadnax remains valid as applied to other cases affecting the 
rights of a fetus and the rights of the mother of a fetus negligently 
killed. Thus, the precise repercussions of Broadnax for wrongful 
death-of-fetus cases still remain to be seen. As additional cases 
percolate up through the New York courts on the issue of maternal 
and fetal rights as related to medical malpractice suits, the true 
scope of Broadnax hopefully will become clearer. 
III. EXPANDING MALPRACTICE LIABILITY IN NEW YORK 
The recent New York Court of Appeals decision in Broadnax 
v. Gonzalez has the potential to either change or altogether 
eliminate the current bars to suits for wrongful death in New 
York.255 Regardless of whether the Broadnax decision opens the 
door to wrongful death litigation, it almost certainly will impact 
the field of obstetrical and gynecological care in New York by 
expanding medical malpractice liability.256 This concern was 
                                                          
253 Id. at 795. 
254 In other words, only by reason of pregnancy does a mother, absent 
independent injury, have a cause of action for emotional damages for negligence 
resulting in harm to her child. Shaw, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 795. 
255 See supra Part II. 
256 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 650. See supra note 12 and accompanying 
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highlighted in Judge Reed’s dissent in Broadnax.257 While she 
stated that “there is no way . . . to predict . . . the potential effect of 
this expansion of liability . . . on the cost and availability of 
gynecological and obstetrical services in New York State,”258 it is 
a general concern among medical practitioners in New York that 
“stifling liability insurance rates could come even closer to 
suffocating them” after the Broadnax decision.259 Doctors and 
insurance carriers are especially concerned that Broadnax will 
result in the filing of an increasing number of lawsuits and, with 
“escalating jury awards” and the high costs of defending a lawsuit, 
additional lawsuits mean higher liability insurance premiums.260 
According to the American Medical Association (AMA), New 
York faces a “medical liability insurance crisis that has physicians 
retiring early, moving to states where insurance rates are lower and 
cutting back on high-risk procedures in an effort to lower insurance 
premiums.”261 The AMA reports that New York physicians pay 
some of the highest rates of liability insurance in the country, in 
the range of up to $200,000 annually.262 Doctors are struggling to 
obtain $1 million in malpractice coverage, but jury awards greater 
than $1 million are frequent in New York, and the average award 
increased from $1.7 million in 1994 to $6 million in 1999.263 
Indeed, fear of staggering liability compels many young doctors 
not to specialize in obstetrics.264 Further, forty-five percent of the 
obstetrical residents who graduated in New York in 2002 have 
                                                          
text. 
257 Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 650. 
258 Id. 
259 Tanya Albert, New York Court Expands Liability in Miscarriage and 
Stillborn Cases AMEDNEWS.COM, para. 1 (2004), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2004/04/26/prsb0426.htm. 
260 Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical 
Malpractice Liability Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health 
Care, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 417-18 (2004). 
261 Albert, supra note 259, at para. 7. 
262 Hearings, supra note 13. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. (citing New York Daily News, Feb. 12, 2004). 
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since left the state to practice elsewhere.265 In response to these and 
other statistics, however, it must be noted that the legislative 
director of the New York Public Interest Research Group has 
asserted that nowhere is there any independent data proving that 
doctors and obstetricians are leaving New York.266 
It is possible that the fear of liability has led to a decrease in the 
number of obstetricians and an increase in the cost of medical 
services available in New York State.267 When there are physician 
shortages, fewer obstetricians and gynecologists are available for 
routine screenings and checkups.268 Consequently, “women lose 
care that helps protect fertility, end pelvic pain, or treat cancer 
early . . . [women have to] travel longer distances to find a doctor, 
have longer waiting periods for appointments, and have shorter 
visits once they get there.”269 Increasing medical liability 
disproportionately harms pregnant women because they are unable 
to get the prenatal and delivery care they need.270 Furthermore, 
obstetric shortages disproportionately impact poor and 
disadvantaged women.271 These women frequently rely on 
community care clinics, which often have to limit the number of 
patients they accept because they cannot shift the costs of their 
rising insurance premiums to their uninsured patients.272 Medical 
care expenses may also increase when doctors, out of fear of 
getting sued, practice what is termed “defensive medicine,” where 
they order too many, and sometimes needless, medical tests to 
                                                          
265 Id. (citing Long Island Business News, Mar. 28, 2003). 
266 Kathleen Kerr, Docs Don’t See a Future in Babies, NEWSDAY, Oct. 19, 
2004, at A06. 
267 Hearings, supra note 13. 
268 News Release, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
Medical Liability Survey Reaffirms More Ob-Gyns Are Quitting Obstetrics 
(2004), available at http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications/press_ 
releases/nr07-16-04.cfm [hereinafter Medical Liability Survey]. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Sarah Domin, Where Have All the Baby-Doctors Gone? Women’s 
Access to Healthcare in Jeopardy: Obstetrics and the Medical Malpractice 
Insurance Crisis, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 499, 537 (2004). 
272 Id. 
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insulate themselves from future lawsuits.273 It is not difficult to 
conclude that with fewer physicians, limited community clinic 
services, and defensive medical practices, women in a lower socio-
economic bracket would face significant difficulties in accessing 
vital gynecological or obstetrical services. 
Some doctors fear that the Broadnax decision could expand 
liability, such that that they will end up in court for cases that 
involved no medical negligence and face jurors who will award 
damages for psychological suffering based not on the degree of 
harm or fault, but on the emotionally-charged nature of fetal 
malpractice cases.274 The vice-chair of the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists expressed concern about the 
potential expansion of liability following Broadnax, noting that “if 
it were a fair fight, it would not be a problem. But the problem is 
that science doesn’t protect us [obstetricians and gynecologists] in 
court” when dealing with such emotional issues.275 Similarly, 
insurers voice concerns that echo doctors’ concerns. Edward 
Amsler, vice president of Medical Liability Mutual Insurance 
Company, which insures most of New York’s physicians, noted to 
Newsday that children who have been injured through negligence 
in utero are very sympathetic plaintiffs and “hence they get huge 
jury verdicts.”276 
In contrast to doctors’ fears of increased medical malpractice 
liability resulting from Broadnax and similar decisions, trial 
lawyers doubt whether Broadnax will have any impact on the crisis 
of medical malpractice liability facing New York and the rest of 
the country; others debate whether there is even a “crisis” at all.277 
In one published reaction to Broadnax, Lenore Kramer, past 
president of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association, 
refuted contentions that Broadnax would increase malpractice 
                                                          
273 Kerr, supra note 266. 
274 Albert, supra note 259, at para. 4. 
275 Id. at para. 5. 
276 Kerr, supra note 266. 
277 John Caher, Liability Widens for Fetal Death Caused by Doctors; 
Distress Damages Do Not Require Bodily Harm to Women, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 2, 
2004, at 1. 
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litigation so as to affect liability rates.278 She declared that the 
ruling in Broadnax 
recognizes a reality of these terrible situations [of medical 
malpractice to fetuses] and brings the law into conformity 
with what people’s understanding of what justice is . . . 
[trial lawyers] sincerely believe that there is no medical 
malpractice crisis and that it is a trumped up issue 
perpetrated by the insurers.279 
In another published reaction, Margaret C. Jasper, one of the 
attorneys representing the appellants in Broadnax, stated that if 
doctors are concerned about unjustified lawsuits, they will need to 
do a better job of “policing their own.”280 Jasper further explained 
that even in clear cases of medical malpractice, it is difficult to 
bring a malpractice case in New York due to statutes of limitations 
and expert testimony requirements.281 Regardless of its impact on 
the medical liability insurance crisis, it is clear that the Broadnax 
decision was “heralded by plaintiff’s attorneys as having brought 
New York out of the dark ages by expanding the amount of 
damages potentially recoverable,”282 with some opining that 
Broadnax merely comports with a growing national sentiment that 
the unborn child is worthy in the eyes of the law.283 Whether an 
increase in the amount of available damages will actually have an 
impact on the cost of malpractice liability insurance in New York 
is yet to be seen. 
There are two specific ways in which the New York State 
                                                          
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 Albert, supra note 259, at para. 15. 
281 Id. at para. 16. 
282 Marian E. Silber and Maria Elyse Rabar, Medical Malpractice 
Litigation; Damages for Stillbirth: Will The Floodgates Be Opened?, N.Y. L. J., 
April 30, 2004, at 3. 
283 Albert, supra note 259. In addition to civil remedies, the nation is also 
seeking criminal remedies for those who injure a child in utero. For example, 
the decision in Broadnax was coincidentally handed down on the same day that 
President George W. Bush signed into law the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 
making it a crime to harm the fetus of a pregnant woman during an assault. 
Caher, supra note 277. 
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legislature could address concerns related to the Broadnax 
decision. First, the legislature could directly address the cause of 
action for wrongful death by statute, either by affirmatively 
denying recovery for these causes of action or by expressly 
allowing for these causes of action.284 This method goes directly to 
the heart of the matter and in fact would determine the impact that 
Broadnax will have on fetal rights litigation related to prenatal 
negligence. 
Alternatively, the legislature could also address the concerns 
resulting from Broadnax by regulating medical malpractice 
liability itself. Damages caps and insurance reform are often 
suggested as two means of stabilizing premium rates for doctors. 
Physicians and the insurance industry generally favor the 
imposition of caps on non-economic damages in medical 
malpractice liability cases as a solution to rising insurance 
premiums.285 This method has been supported primarily by 
Republican legislators at both the state and federal level.286 
California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) 
is one such model of damage cap legislation.287 MICRA places a 
$250,000 cap on the amount of compensation awarded to 
malpractice victims for their non-economic injuries.288 The New 
                                                          
284 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. §16-62-102 
(2004). South Dakota and Arkansas have statutes that expressly allow for causes 
of wrongful death for the fetus negligently killed in utero. Id. 
285 Glassman, supra note 260, at 419 (noting that physicians and the 
insurance industry place the blame for escalating malpractice liability insurance 
rates on an excess of litigation and high jury awards). Non-economic damages 
are defined generally as damages awarded for a litigant’s past and/or future pain 
and suffering. Id. at 423 n.27. 
286 Id. at 419. The GOP’s objective is to impose federal caps on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice cases and to take the decision out of 
the hands of the states. Id. 
287 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 2005); see also Hearings, supra 
note 13 (statement to Congress in which the American Medical Association 
advocates federal legislation based on California’s medical liability reform act, 
known as MICRA). 
288 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 2005). Non-economic damages, as 
defined in the California statute, include pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical 
impairment, disfigurement and other non-pecuniary injury. Id. 
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York legislature could enact a similar cap on non-economic 
damages.289 A cap might propel more obstetricians and 
gynecologists back into high-risk practices, thus helping to 
alleviate the women’s healthcare crisis that might result from the 
Broadnax decision. However, opponents to a similar proposal in 
the U.S. House of Representatives have stated that 
[a cap on non-economic damages in healthcare lawsuits] 
offers a “solution” prior to having discovered the root of 
the problem. Instead of reducing the occurrence of 
frivolous lawsuits, providing direct assistance to health care 
providers and communities, and examining every aspect of 
this problem [i.e., doctors facing soaring medical 
malpractice insurance premiums], this legislation restricts 
the legal rights of those who have been truly wronged.290 
Insurance reform has been suggested as an alternative means of 
reducing or stabilizing doctors’ insurance premium costs.291 
Insurance reform is supported primarily by Democratic state and 
federal legislators, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, 
state trial lawyer associations, and consumer watchdog groups.292 
These groups are critical of federal caps and maintain that caps 
have not proven successful in either lowering or stabilizing 
premiums.293 Indeed, as noted in a 2003 study released by the 
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights on the relative 
success of California’s MICRA statute, malpractice caps, and other 
restrictions on patients’ rights did not actually lower or stabilize 
premiums, as insurers and doctors claimed; rather, it was the 
implementation of California’s insurance reform initiative in 1988 
that reduced California doctors’ premiums by twenty percent over 
three years.294 This law resulted in a rate freeze, a rate rollback, 
                                                          
289 Medical Liability Survey, supra note 268. 
290 Glassman, supra note 260, at 424 n.39. 
291  FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, HOW 
INSURANCE REFORM LOWERED DOCTORS’ MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES IN 
CALIFORNIA (Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/ 
healthcare/rp/rp003103.pdf [hereinafter INSURANCE REFORM]. 
292 Glassman, supra note 260, at 420. 
293 Id. 
294 INSURANCE REFORM, supra note 291. 
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and stringent regulation that reduced premiums in all lines of 
insurance, including medical malpractice.295 Thus, the New York 
State legislature might be well advised to adopt insurance reforms 
similar to those implemented in California and to require that 
insurance companies roll back premium rates to offset any 
concerns about the rising costs of medical malpractice insurance in 
the aftermath of the Broadnax decision. 
Clearly, divergent views exist as to whether Broadnax will 
affect the medical liability crisis faced by obstetricians and 
gynecologists in New York. Some even question whether a crisis 
exists at all. However, even if the crisis is “trumped up,” as some 
opine, it is almost certain that the legislature will address the crisis, 
or potential crisis, through initiatives that either eliminate possible 
causes of action for the wrongful death of fetuses, impose caps on 
malpractice verdicts, or enact insurance premium reforms. Thus, 
while Broadnax’s impact may be a drop in the bucket in terms of 
affecting the availability or cost of obstetrical or gynecological 
care in New York, it has almost assuredly contributed to fear that 
the availability or cost of obstetrical or gynecological care could be 
compromised by expanding liability in the area of wrongful death. 
Indeed, this fear may be what spurs the legislators to take action. 
CONCLUSION 
The New York Court of Appeals’s recent decision in Broadnax 
v. Gonzalez overturned nearly twenty years of precedent in which 
New York courts refused to permit mothers to recover emotional 
damages for negligently caused stillbirths or miscarriages absent 
independent injuries of their own. In declaring that both the fetus 
and the mother are owed a duty of care, and by expanding the 
rights of the fetus by assigning a cause of action to the mother, 
Broadnax may have far-reaching implications for other causes of 
action involving fetal rights, namely, suits for wrongful death. 
While the victims of negligence clearly deserve to have their 
                                                          
295 Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, Five Dangerous Myths 
About California’s Medical Malpractice Restrictions, at http://www.consumer 
watchdog.org/healthcare/fs/fs003009.php3 (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). 
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injuries redressed, doctors are justifiably concerned that expanding 
liability will result in higher insurance premiums, forcing 
obstetricians to abandon high-risk patients or even the practice of 
obstetrics and gynecology in New York altogether, thereby 
lowering the quality of obstetrical and gynecological care provided 
in this state. This result would undermine one of the principal 
purposes of medical malpractice liability—to encourage 
accountability in medicine and to ensure the availability of high-
quality healthcare. If an increase in the number of malpractice 
lawsuits results in an exodus of obstetrical and gynecological 
physicians from the medical field, it must be asked whether this 
expansion of liability is beneficial for New York in the long run. In 
addressing this question, the courts have faced difficult decisions 
and have demonstrated a desire to leave the expansion of tort 
liability to the legislature. Given the court’s reluctance to address 
this area of the law, the legislature must seriously examine the 
trend of expanding fetal rights in New York and the United States 
generally and take affirmative steps to either expressly accept or 
reject the extension of these rights to wrongful death causes of 
action. Only with definitive and clear statutes will this murky area 
of fetal rights ever be resolved in New York. 
 
